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Contesting the financialization of urban space: Community organizations 
and the struggle to preserve affordable rental housing in New York City 
 
 
As cities have become both site and object of capital accumulation in a neoliberal 
political economy, the challenges to community practice aimed at creating, 
preserving and improving affordable housing and neighborhoods have grown. In 
large part, the contemporary infrastructure of urban community organizations is 
rooted in the social movements of the 1960s and the urban struggles of the 1970s, 
when the cities faced a crisis of disinvestment and capital flight. Today urban 
struggles revolve more around claiming and preserving space for low-income 
residents in a context where urban land and housing are central nodes in global 
capital flows. The role of financial practices in the foreclosure crisis and global 
economic downturn of 2007-2009 highlights how neoliberal restructuring (such as 
deregulation in banking and finance and global financial integration) has made 
financial markets and actors increasingly central to the workings of capitalism, 
and how these changes have transformed the meaning and significance of 
mortgage capital in local communities, redrawing the relationship between 
housing and urban inequality. 
This paper builds on existing research and theory dealing with the 
financialization of housing and home by focusing on how urban community 
organizations contend with financialization in their practice, and by extending the 
focus to the financialization of rental housing. The basis of the paper is a series of 
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in-depth interviews with emerging, midcareer and veteran affordable housing and 
community development professionals about a wave of aggressive private equity 
acquisition of affordable rental housing in New York City during the mid-2000s 
real estate bubble, and the subsequent collapse of many such investments. 
Financialization poses new challenges for community groups whose work 
revolves around affordable housing. However, community-based organizations 
also demonstrate an ability to contest the impact of financialization through 
advancing critical narratives, producing quantitative and geographic data to 
document relationships among investment practices and housing distress, and 
reworking the sites, spaces and structures of finance. These responses suggest 
productive directions for contemporary community practice. Although wholly 
transforming or subverting financialization cannot be achieved by community 
practice alone, the activities analyzed in this paper contribute to thinking about an 
urban politics of finance.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First I provide 
background on the practice of urban community organizations, particularly 
changing constraints and demands associated with neoliberal restructuring. Then I 
consider arguments about the political possibilities for community practice in this 
context. This leads in to an overview of the significance of financialization in 
contemporary global capitalism generally, and particularly how this relates to 
housing. I then provide further explication of private equity real estate investment 
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in New York’s affordable rental sector and think through how these investments 
produce urban space and pose challenges to community practice. With this 
background in place, I move on to a brief description of research methods before 
delving into the main findings on the accomplishments of community-based 
organizations in their efforts to reform, rework and regulate financialization.  
In turn, the findings address the critical narrative of private equity real 
estate investment developed and advanced by community groups; the role 
strategic research played in their efforts; and how organizations took up sites, 
spaces, and structures of global finance to contest predatory investment practices. 
In conclusion I discuss how the practices and activities of urban community 
organizations analyzed in this paper speak to alternative knowledge production 
and reimagined modes of spatial practice as some critical elements of formulating 
response to the challenges posed by financialization. 
Background 
Neoliberal restructuring and community practice 
The United States has a long history of community development (efforts 
to improve living conditions and quality of life) in low-income urban 
neighborhoods, going back to the Progressive Era. Today’s field of community 
development is most closely linked with movements, organizations and policies 
emerging in the 1960s (DeFilippis & Saegert, 2012; Sites, Chaskin, & Parks, 
2007). This is when urban political activism associated with the Civil Rights, 
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Black Power and other oppositional social movements working for self-
determination, political participation and material resources for low-income 
residents briefly converged with federal policies that provided financial support 
for community political organizing (DeFilippis, 2004; Newman & Lake, 2006; 
O'Connor, 2012). However this period was short-lived as federal policy shifted in 
the late 1960s from direct support of local political organizing to providing 
funding to cities and states for community economic development (DeFilippis, 
2004).  
The distinction between activist community organizing for political and 
social change and resource redistribution, and professionalized community 
development focused on local regeneration and service provision can be traced to 
this shift, when community groups faced a choice between preserving their 
political identity or maintaining government funding (DeFilippis, 2004). In this 
paper, rather than dichotomizing the activities of community organizations as 
either organizing or development, I rely on the term “practice”. This decision is 
pragmatic given the range of organizations participating in the study, and based 
on a theoretical understanding of community organizations as taking up multiple 
roles that shift along with goals and context (Elwood, 2006). 
Although today’s infrastructure of community organizations is linked to 
social movements driven by goals of redistribution and political empowerment, 
these goals stand at odds with neoliberal imperatives of market rule and 
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competition, entrepreneurial governance and individual responsibility. For 
community organizations the turn to a neoliberal political economy entails both 
heightened constraints in the form of reduced and restricted funding, and greater 
demands associated with a weakened social safety net. Increased state control 
over the distribution and use of federal block grant funds and an expanded role for 
intermediary institutions and private foundations (DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 
2009; J. Fraser & Kick, 2005) mean that available funding often comes with 
strings attached and pressure to conform to funders’ visions and demands. These 
changes in funding streams constrain the autonomy of organizations and their 
constituents in planning, setting priorities and making decisions about 
neighborhood change (DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 2006; J. Fraser & Kick, 
2005). Competition for limited funds may undermine inter-organization 
collaboration and require staff to professionalize, e.g. to demonstrate asset 
management capacity (Bockmeyer, 2003; DeFilippis et al., 2006; J. Fraser & 
Kick, 2005). Professionalization cuts into time and energy for other efforts, such 
as political organizing, potentially disconnecting organizations from their 
constituents. Organizations have increased their provision of services in response 
to social welfare gaps (e.g. in affordable housing, health care, and workforce 
development) created by declining federal support for state and local government. 
This also changes relationships with community residents, with members often 
becoming clients (DeFilippis et al., 2006, 2009; Fisher & Shragge, 2000).  
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As community groups have adapted to this context, many have grown 
enmeshed with the state and market structures they once resisted (DeFilippis, 
2004). This distance from radical politics and conflict-based models of organizing 
can diminish the potential to contest the power relations that cause inequalities 
(Newman & Lake, 2006). For example many organizations now seek to address 
the lack of affordable housing in urban neighborhoods by developing and 
managing rental properties through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
program; more politicized approaches might focus on decommodifying land and 
housing. DeFilippis (2004) argues this is because many community groups 
formed to address local problems, rather than to fundamentally transform social, 
political and economic structures. The 1990s reconfiguration of community 
development around asset development and opening underserved urban markets 
further reinforced this local focus by emphasizing building capacity, community, 
and social capital within neighborhoods. The neglect of power and structural 
forces outside the community is especially problematic because it obscures the 
increasingly multilevel and global processes shaping local problems and potential 
solutions (DeFilippis et al., 2006).  
Indeed as neoliberal urbanization has made cities central arenas for capital 
investment and accumulation, urban community organizations are not contending 
with the effects of disinvestment so much as the consequences of opening  
“underserved” central-city markets to mobile and under-regulated global capital. 
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Even as urban neighborhoods are integral to the functioning and reproduction of 
global capitalism, local community organizations are limited in how they can 
shape and transform the neoliberal political economy (DeFilippis & Saegert, 
2012). Contesting the social costs of capitalism to working class and marginalized 
peoples (DeFilippis & Saegert, 2012) calls for new political strategies and 
rescaled forms of activism based on an analysis of power relations that moves 
beyond the local (DeFilippis et al., 2006; Newman & Lake, 2006).  
Multiple roles, spatial strategies and alternative knowledge production in 
community practice 
Although neoliberalism has reshaped community practice, this doesn’t 
entirely foreclose the pursuit of progressive social justice outcomes by community 
organizations. Instead, we might ask both a general question about how activists 
“continue their work once the movement is reconfigured into new, more formal 
institutions” (Majic, 2011 p.831) and a historically specific one about the 
potential for community practice to contribute to social justice in the 21st century 
(Sites et al., 2007). Given that conflict approaches became marginalized soon 
after their 1960s-1970s heyday, using these approaches as the reference point for 
contemporary community practice may delimit understandings of how 
community organizations contest the imperatives of neoliberal restructuring and 
its toll on urban neighborhoods. As Larner and Craig (2005) argue, “neoliberal 
spaces and subjectivities are not simply imposed from above, nor is ‘resistance’ 
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simply a bottom-up political response to macro-level structural processes” 
(p.421). The truth is inevitably more complex. Just as attending to ‘actually 
existing’ neoliberalism reveals that it is incomplete, nuanced, context-dependent 
and contingent rather than monolithic (Brenner & Theodore, 2002), tracing the  
particularities of contemporary community practice may point to new political 
strategies and forms of activism. Now I turn to some promising directions in this 
effort that are particularly relevant to this study: understandings of community 
organizations as taking up multiple roles, producing alternative forms of 
knowledge and engaging in new spatial strategies. 
Rather than falling into binaries of opposition and co-optation or 
professionalization and resistance, community practice produces multiple and 
diverse roles and relationships (Elwood, 2006). Indeed changing the terms of 
neoliberal urban governance depends on organizational roles that encompass local 
activism, professional roles and relationships, and networking and relationship 
management skills (Larner & Craig, 2005). In this view, activist practices may 
“strategically combine opposition with engagement in order to advance their 
agenda”, serving as a more subtle and indirect form of contestation (Leitner, Peck, 
& Sheppard, 2007b, p. 320; Majic, 2011; Roy, 2011; Zupan, 2011). Thus 
professionalized roles and public-private-community partnerships can potentially 
generate new forums for the pursuit of activist goals (Larner & Craig, 2005; 
Majic, 2011).  
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Alternative knowledge production such as research, policy advocacy and 
narrative construction contribute critical perspectives to “the war of ideas” in 
which neoliberal rationality dominates (Leitner, Peck, et al., 2007b; Majic, 2011). 
Thus while community groups frequently undertake research and analysis as part 
of grant maintenance, these activities can also contribute to political projects: 
community organizations might use Geographic Information Systems to create 
community-oriented maps, analyze public and proprietary data (e.g. Census data, 
investment prospectuses) and collect their own data to make claims on the state 
and the private sector, e.g. real estate developers and financial institutions. These 
efforts are a form of “strategic positivism”: using sanctioned methods of 
producing knowledge (with an emphasis on quantitative approaches), deployed 
via postmodern sensibilities of multiple meanings in the service of politically 
progressive aims (Wyly, 2009, 2011). Strategic positivism recognizes that 
research is always political, and thus represents an important aspect of working 
toward urban social justice. For example, community organizations might employ 
critical research to disseminate alternative knowledge in public testimony and 
support progressive policy development (Majic, 2011).  
In addition to strategic positivism and policy advocacy, organizations 
produce alternative knowledge by advancing critical narratives to counter 
neoliberal discourses of the privatized, entrepreneurial and marketized city 
(Leitner, Sheppard, Sziarto, & Maringanti, 2007). Reframing mainstream attitudes 
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and policies (such as those concerning urban revitalization) can serve to articulate 
and advance the interests and needs of marginalized groups and places (for 
example by debating the impact of redevelopment on quality of life and wealth 
distribution) (Wolf-Powers, 2009). The understanding of community groups as 
taking on multiple roles suggests the potential for community practice to construct 
multiple narratives. For example Elwood (2006) proposes narratives of needs and 
injustice, assets and accomplishments and reinterpretive narratives that present 
official data through new frames to reinterpret a local issue in terms of broader 
social, economic or political inequalities. These narratives might serve as place 
frames (D. Martin, 2003) that respectively mobilize residents and make claims on 
elected officials, define and build community within a neighborhood and promote 
collective action across neighborhood boundaries. 
Finally the central role of urban space in neoliberal strategy calls for 
rescaled and resituated activism. Networking across space allows activists to 
share information, coordinate activities and expand local power into regional, 
national and global movements (Leitner, Peck, & Sheppard, 2007a). Here Katz 
(2001) offers counter-topography as a political strategy for working against the 
fragmentation of place. Countertopographies trace contour lines that analytically 
connect geographically distinct places (such as the dynamics of dispossession 
linking informal settlements of the Global South with urban neighborhoods in the 
U.S., “and thereby enhance struggles in the name of common interests” (Katz, 
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2001, p. 1230). This relates to Allen’s (2011) approach to geographies of power, 
in which power is spatialized not at fixed scales of distance and location 
(topography), but in terms of “reach”. Changing what can be demanded 
politically, powers of reach describe the ability for different actors to make their 
presence felt by drawing distant others close, or placing themselves beyond reach 
(Allen, 2011). These insights take on new significance in relation to the 
financialization of housing, in which the circuit of finance represents a complex 
terrain for social and political struggle.  
Financialization of housing  
The hegemonic role of finance in neoliberal restructuring forms a major 
area of contention for contemporary community practice. With market 
liberalization deregulating the banking and finance industries and opening up 
global capital flows, financial markets and actors have become increasingly 
central to the workings of capitalism itself (Fine, 2009; Krippner, 2005; 
Stockhammer, 2010), and thus to the production of urban space (French, Leyshon, 
& Wainwright, 2011; Rutland, 2010; Weber, 2002). This financialization denotes 
an economic shift where growth revolves around financial markets, products and 
practices rather than industrial production (Krippner, 2005). Even where “real” 
commodities are involved, profits increasingly accrue through their monetization 
and integration in financial channels (Fine, 2009; Gotham, 2009; Stockhammer, 
2010). This creates a new role for finance in non-financial realms: financial 
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institutions and markets have a tremendous influence on contemporary economic, 
social and cultural life and individual subjectivities (Aalbers, 2008; Allon, 2010; 
French et al., 2011; Ron Martin, 2011; Rutland, 2010). With the extended reach of 
finance also comes the transmission of risk and volatility into the non-financial, 
participating in and potentially exacerbating already uneven geographies 
(Aalbers, 2008; Pike & Pollard, 2010).  
Interest in financialization has grown in the aftermath of the foreclosure 
crisis and associated global financial downturn. Activist struggles for access to 
mortgage capital in the 1970s sought to build wealth in low-income and minority 
communities. However the role of mortgages has since changed, with mortgage 
debt serving as a means of financial production by providing the “raw materials” 
for asset-backed securities and derivatives (Newman, 2009). Thus the meaning of 
mortgage capital for local communities has also changed: rather than anchoring 
wealth in place via property, today mortgages facilitate global investment and the 
extraction of value from place-bound property (Aalbers, 2008).  
In the foreclosure crisis, demand for financial yield associated with 
mortgage-backed securities drove high-risk and predatory lending practices, 
which in turn contributed exponentially to the severity of the foreclosure crisis 
and ensuing financial crisis and economic downturn (Aalbers, 2008; Ashton, 
2009; Gotham, 2009; Newman, 2009). Furthermore, such high-risk lending 
practices intersected with older frameworks of racial inequality, so that the 
  
13 
foreclosure crisis has disproportionately destabilized low-income and minority 
communities and African-American female-headed households (Wyly, Moos, 
Hammel, & Kabahizi, 2009). Meanwhile upstream actors have even profited from 
the housing market collapse (Morgenson & Story, 2009; Story & Morgenson, 
2010). This state of affairs underlines how the financialization of housing has 
transferred the wealth of broad sectors of society to a narrow financial class 
(Aalbers, 2008; Harvey, 2003).  
Despite the clear social, spatial and political dimensions of the 
financialization of housing, further critical attention to these concerns is needed 
among researchers at the intersection of society, economy and space (Aalbers, 
2008; French et al., 2011; Pike & Pollard, 2010). This paper addresses these 
concerns by focusing on how community organizations engage with the process, 
actors and consequences of the financialization of rental housing in low-income 
urban neighborhoods. Here I turn to the case of “predatory equity” a mid-2000s 
wave of aggressive private equity investment in New York City’s affordable 
rental stock that demonstrates the financialization of rental housing. 
Predatory equity in New York City 
New York is a city of renters (69% of its residents rent), and the majority 
(75%) of the city’s rental units are located in multifamily dwellings (buildings 
with five or more units) (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2010; 
Mazur & Wilson, 2011). Thus four in ten renters, or about 2.3 million people, are 
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tenants in multifamily buildings (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban 
Policy, 2010). Like the single-family market, in the mid-2000s the multifamily 
market also experienced inflated property values, weakened underwriting 
standards, rapid turnover, and increased demand for mortgage-backed securities 
(Congressional Oversight Panel, 2010; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011; 
Parkus & An, 2009). Also similar to the single-family market, since 2008 the 
multifamily market has undergone a rapid downturn and increased delinquencies 
and foreclosures (especially on securitized loans) (Congressional Oversight Panel, 
2010; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011; Parkus & An, 2009).  In New York 
these dynamics played out in the city’s affordable rental sector through predatory 
investments by private equity firms, which I now address in detail. 
By 2005, the combination of low stock market returns and flood of low-
interest mortgage financing of the early 2000s with the city’s historically tight 
rental market (the rental vacancy rate has been below 5% for over 40 years) 
pointed to multifamily rental housing as a frontier for capital in search of new 
investment opportunities. The city’s rent-stabilized housing, which includes 
around a million units, was especially attractive to investors. State laws protect 
these units from the sudden and sharp rent hikes of the open market by limiting 
rent increases to a percentage set annually by the Rent Guidelines Board; however 
the laws were substantially weakened in the 1990s. “Luxury decontrol” made it 
possible to deregulate units once their monthly rent exceeds $2000 (this ceiling is 
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being raised to $2500) while the introduction of other mechanisms, such as 
vacancy bonuses and major capital improvement increases, help facilitate 
deregulation. These respectively allow owners to increase rent 20% each time a 
unit turns over to a new tenant, and to pass on some of the costs of upgrading to 
tenants; oversight of the latter is notoriously weak and the program is subject to 
fraud (Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, hereafter 
ANHD, 2009a). Wyly and colleagues (2010) argue that luxury decontrol, without 
an inflation adjustment, “has morphed into an automatic deregulation machine, 
liberating units whenever strong demand pushes rents high enough” (p. 2609).  
This erosion of market protections mediating the landlord-tenant relation 
(Wyly et al., 2010) helped set the scene for the financialization of rent-stabilized 
housing by private equity funds. Private equity began to aggressively target the 
affordable rental sector around 2005, buying up 100,000 units (about 10% of the 
supply of rent-stabilized housing) by 2009 (ANHD 2009b). The purchases stood 
out not only because of the number of units affected, but because of their scale—
multiple properties were assembled in package deals as large as 50 buildings, and 
firms paid extremely inflated prices based on “frothy” appraisals, gross 
overestimation of rental income and gross underestimation of operating expenses 
(ANHD, 2009b). Under these terms, the deals could only succeed by displacing 
tenants paying affordable rents and cutting back on maintenance costs. Advocates 
termed the investments “predatory equity” to highlight the actors involved and the 
  
16 
extractive nature of the investments vis-à-vis the supply of affordable rental 
housing. The term also draws on heightened public awareness of the dangers of 
predatory lending in the homeownership market.  
Predatory equity demonstrates a broader financialization of the social 
realm, where public, common or collective goods serve as the materials for 
financial production and capital accumulation (Fine, 2009; N. Fraser, 2010). Of 
course, rental housing is defined by its dual nature as a business for owners and a 
home for tenants. This makes it important to clarify how predatory equity is an 
example of financialization specifically versus property speculation more 
generally. Here I address the aspects of predatory equity investments most 
characteristic of financialization: the new role of capital market actors, norms and 
processes in the affordable rental market (French et al., 2011; Pike & Pollard, 
2010); the increased interdependence between finance and the built environment 
(Aalbers, 2008); and the interlocking of finance with “the lives, homes and 
households of ordinary citizens” (Allon, 2010, p. 373).  
First, the encroachment of the financial into the non-financial: the city’s 
affordable rental sector has largely been a “financial backwater” (ANHD, 2009b, 
p. 8) because of the non-liquid nature of the assets, which return moderate profits 
of 7-8% a year taken as income (not capital gains). This encourages long-term 
ownership, making for a low-pressure market (ANHD, 2009b). Moreover except 
in the case of properties with more than 50 units, multifamily property owners are 
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mainly individuals or limited partnerships, not corporations or financial entities 
(Savage, 1998). By contrast predatory equity investments entailed the penetration 
of this market by private equity firms, which typically seek returns of 10-20% a 
year over relatively short investment terms of three to five years (Evans & 
Habbard, 2008; Froud & Williams, 2007). This highlights a “fundamental 
discrepancy” between “the expectations of capital markets for double-digit asset 
growth and the single-digit growth achievable in most real product markets” 
(French et al., 2011, p. 803). Firms sought to achieve these expectations through 
the high-risk leveraging typical of private equity. For example in a group of ten 
major investment portfolios covering 27,000 rental units, properties had an 
average of only 55 cents of income for every dollar of debt (ANHD, 2009b). 
Indeed many deals started out overleveraged, loaded with debt that far 
outweighed their rental income (Shultz, 2009). 
This leads into the impact of finance in the everyday life of residents and 
the increased interdependence between finance and the built environment, which I 
address together here. The profit expectations and debt load associated with 
predatory equity deals were predicated on rates of tenant turnover in the range of 
20% or more a year, whereas the typical turnover rate for rent-stabilized units is 
5-10% a year (Rent Guidelines Board, 2009). Meeting these turnover objectives 
required efforts to “promote attrition”, which entailed systematic harassment such 
as building-wide eviction notices, baseless lawsuits for unpaid rent, aggressive 
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buy-out offers, refusal to make repairs inside units and threats to call immigration 
authorities (ANHD, 2009b; Morgenson, 2008; Powell, 2011). Such harassment 
represents some of the problematic social consequences that can come with the 
extended reach of finance into the realm of the non-financial. It also speaks to the 
uneven nature of processes of financialization (French et al., 2011; Pike & 
Pollard, 2010)1: New Yorkers living in multifamily rental properties have lower 
incomes and are more likely to be Hispanic than those living in other housing 
types (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2010), putting these 
groups at disproportionate risk of the negative social externalities  of 
financialization. 
However the market crash of 2008 brought unsustainable debt on 
predatory equity deals to the fore, with many standing at risk of (or already in) 
default or foreclosure in the years since. In one example, a 47-building East 
Harlem portfolio purchased in 2007 by London-based investment firm Dawnay 
Day fell into foreclosure in 2009 as the firm found itself overexposed in the credit 
crunch. Financial distress in many predatory equity portfolios means that 
harassment has given way to rapid, extreme physical deterioration in living 
conditions. This illustrates how financialization increasingly ties the fate of the 
built environment to what happens in financial circuits (Aalbers, 2008). In turn 
these conditions compromise tenants’ well-being, family and social relationships 
                                                        
1 I address the neighborhood geography of predatory equity in more depth in other writing. 
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and housing security, once again along lines of race and class (Fields, in 
preparation).  
Whereas predatory equity may have first been based on speculative 
motivations for the properties themselves (albeit with expectations of capital 
market-level returns), the market crash affords speculation of another kind—in 
debt.  Many scholars have thought through securitization as an example of how 
financialization commodifies mortgages on the back end (see Gotham, 2009 for 
an overview), but most of the debt connected to predatory equity deals was not 
securitized. Still, mortgage finance can transcend real estate’s spatial fixity by 
other means. For example, private equity firms operate through leveraging equity 
and debt to acquire assets: to a great extent profit depends not on the asset’s 
condition (or location), but on the degree of credit capital leveraged (Linneman, 
2004). Should the leveraged debt become distressed, it becomes its own financial 
product; indeed the private equity distressed debt market has evolved from a 
concept to a global investment market since the early 1990s (DuPonte, 2010).  
As predatory equity investments have grown physically and financially 
unstable a market in distressed mortgage notes has emerged, putting properties at 
risk of an extended period of equity-stripping and physical decline. Here the 
financialization of rental housing is not simply aggressive speculation that bids up 
under-market property assets, but the creation of distressed financial assets that in 
turn resituates speculation in the circuits of finance.  
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As a case of the financialization of rental housing, predatory equity 
presents a call to action for New York City’s infrastructure of community 
organizations, many of which were instrumental in responding to the city’s earlier 
crisis of disinvestment and abandonment in the 1970s. However the dynamics of 
financialization also present potential obstacles to action. The actors involved in 
predatory equity deals are difficult to target and hold accountable because they are 
unfamiliar, diffuse and spatially removed. Meanwhile, navigating the intricacies 
of mortgage finance, note sales and the securities market calls for a set of legal 
and financial skills and nimble access to capital that even the most sophisticated 
nonprofit groups lack.  
Within this context, community organizations face the challenge of 
“inventing spaces of action” (Miraftab, 2009). In the remainder of this paper I 
consider how community organizations have engaged with predatory equity, 
focusing on what their responses show about the possibility for multiple roles, 
spatial strategies and alternative knowledge production in community practice. To 
ground these findings I first offer a brief overview of research methods.  
Methods 
This paper analyzes responses to predatory equity by community 
organizations in New York City, focusing on what they show about political 
possibilities and challenges for community practice in relation to the 
financialization of rental housing. I conducted 26 interviews with veteran (11 
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participants), mid-career (6 participants) and emerging (9 participants) affordable 
housing and community development professionals. Participants were employed 
at a variety of longstanding and newer community organizations with 
neighborhood-specific and citywide missions. I also interviewed a handful of 
individuals working in housing policy, property management, for-profit 
affordable housing, and housing finance (insert table 1 here). Interviews focused 
on organizational responses to predatory equity and the challenges and successes 
they associated with these efforts; actual and potential outcomes of predatory 
equity; collaborations and partnerships with other organizations; and how 
predatory equity compared to recent waves of gentrification and 1970s-era 
disinvestment. I also draw on my ongoing contact with participants (e.g. through 
conferences, communication of findings); artifacts such as blogs and pamphlets 
related to predatory equity; and information found in local newspapers, the 
websites of investors and community organizations, and trade publications for the 
finance and community development sectors.  
The findings reported here focus most closely on the efforts of mainly 
longstanding community organizations including the Urban Homesteading 
Assistance Board, the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, 
the University Neighborhood Housing Program (an offshoot of the Northwest 
Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition), Community Action for Safe 
Apartments (a project of New Settlement Apartments) and Tenants and 
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Neighbors; as well as newer grassroots organizing group Movement for Justice in 
el Barrio. The work of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation2 and real estate 
think tank/advocacy group Citizens Housing and Planning Council of New York 
City (established in 1937) also played a role in these efforts.  
Below, I present the findings in terms of what responses to predatory 
equity suggest about the potential for contemporary community practice to contest 
financialization. I organize the around three major analytics: constructing a 
critical narrative, practicing strategic positivism and reworking financial sites, 
spaces and structures.  
Findings 
Constructing a critical narrative 
 As predatory equity emerged around 2005 individual organizations 
struggled to make sense of both the sudden interest of buyers from out of the state 
and country in affordable rental properties, and the high prices they were paying. 
Neither the locations of the purchases, which were in places that seemed odd for 
foreign investment, nor the prices, compared to market prices and the realities of 
income and expenses in the properties, made sense. Coming together, a core 
group of longtime community organizations including the Northwest Bronx 
Community and Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC), the Association for Neighborhood 
and Housing Development (ANHD), the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board 
                                                        
2 The Local Initiatives Support Corporation is a national intermediary organization providing 
funding assistance and technical support to local nonprofits. 
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(UHAB) and Tenants and Neighbors collaborated to track the investments, 
finding that thousands of apartments were potentially overleveraged (Shultz, 
Walsh, & Levy, 2010). 
However as community groups sought to confront buyers and financial 
institutions with this information (around 2006), they were also coming up against 
the dominant logic of the real estate boom. The entire country was caught up in 
buying and flipping property to build wealth. Investors framed predatory equity 
strategy in terms like “recapturing” value, and “repositioning and releasing” 
regulated units to the open rental market (Morgenson, 2010; Powell, 2011).  
Firms saw affordable rental properties as “having added value for investors”, 
arguing “revitalization would occur” with “an improved tenant base and increased 
rental income” (Milbank Real Estate, 2007). Countering this narrative was 
challenging because of the real estate boom, but also because of a view of housing 
advocates as hyperbolic, emotional and being politically exteme, and therefore not 
credible (interview with Dina Levy of UHAB, 2010). 
Thus despite their long histories and well-established relationships with 
city agencies and financial institutions, it took UHAB and other core 
organizations more than two years of research and advocacy--and the 2007-2008 
market crash--to legitimate predatory equity as a threat to affordable housing 
(interview with Dina Levy of UHAB, 2010). Still these experiences provided 
critical insight into the dynamics of financialization, such as banks’ ability to shed 
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risk via securitization and sales of distressed mortgage notes. Using this 
knowledge and perspective, organizations developed a critical narrative of 
predatory equity that implicated the structures of global finance and key actors 
such as private equity firms and lending institutions, and reinterpreted the norms 
of finance in terms of the fallout of boom time speculation on the quality and 
supply of affordable rental housing. With these efforts activists made 
financialization legible and accessible for wider public understanding, and 
mobilization in subsequent organizing and policy campaigns.  
Predatory Equity: The Survival Guide, a collaborative effort between 
UHAB, Tenants and Neighbors, and the Center for Urban Pedagogy exemplifies 
this narrative. The Survival Guide (Center for Urban Pedagogy, 2009, hereafter 
CUP) translates the complexities of predatory equity into everyday language and 
images understandable to the broader public (insert figure 1 about here). The 
Survival Guide explains the logic and strategy of predatory equity, analyzing the 
basic math behind how predatory equity leverages properties beyond what their 
net rental income can cover. Throughout the Guide imagery represents housing as 
a means of predatory financial production, such as a dollar sign formed by a snake 
squeezing two apartment buildings (insert figure 2 about here), and mortgage 
securitization as an assembly line. The Survival Guide also includes a “To Do” 
list identifying a variety of actors and what they can do to help stop predatory 
equity, including: advocates and housing experts; banks; elected officials; media; 
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private equity firms; tenants; and institutional investors. By framing predatory 
equity and solutions as inherently multi-sectoral and requiring action on many 
fronts, the Guide makes the set of stakeholders involved in predatory equity 
visible and makes claims on them by outlining “to-dos” for each.   
By no means was the Survival Guide the only means of constructing a 
critical narrative of predatory equity; groups also used traditional press 
conferences, articles in affordable housing trade publications (cf. Levy, 2011) and 
policy advocacy that leveraged their existing networks. By 2008, the fallout of the 
broader housing and financial crisis was becoming clear and opinion leaders, 
government officials and academics began to acknowledge predatory equity as a 
crisis as well. Community organizations see the activist community as 
“extraordinarily successful in creating this term ‘predatory equity’ and really 
getting it out there to policymakers, the politicians and the press” (interview with 
Benjamin Dulchin of ANHD, 2011) crediting “the story we told” with mobilizing 
resources and support from the city.  
Media, politicians and city officials reproduced the terminology 
community groups used and began framing the issue similarly. For example, the 
New York City Council created the Predatory Equity Task Force, describing the 
problem as community organizations did: “At the height of the housing boom, a 
large number of equity investor groups purchased multifamily rental properties 
using unrealistic revenue expectations and taking out loans that could not be 
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supported by existing rent rolls” (New York City Council, 2009). New York State 
Senator Charles Schumer also got on board, highlighting the role of banks and 
parallels to subprime lending in the homeownership market: “Speculators have 
been unjustifiably raising their estimates for how much rent they will take in after 
they buy the property and low-ball how much maintenance costs will be in order 
to get a larger mortgage from the bank. The larger the loan, the larger the fees the 
bank can take in, and then, similar to a subprime loan, the bank securitizes the 
mortgage on the secondary market” (Schumer, 2008). And from 2008 to 2011, the 
New York Times ran 23 articles including the term “predatory equity”, several of 
them in the business pages (cf. Bagli, 2008; Dolnick, 2010; Morgenson, 2008).  
Constructing and circulating a critical narrative of predatory equity that 
got taken up in public discourse was an accomplishment. The struggle to get 
predatory equity acknowledged as a crisis also led community organizations to 
rethink their role in public discourse, cultivating a sense that advocates alone 
could not reframe the conversation. Instead lobbying opinion leaders and “people 
who are seen as credible in these much bigger universes of economic real estate 
finance” to “come out early and say what needs to happen” (interview with Dina 
Levy of UHAB, 2010) has become integral to disseminating alternative narratives 
produced by community groups.  
Strategic positivism: Interweaving data, claims-making and policy advocacy 
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Community organizations invented spaces of action not only in their 
narratives around predatory equity, but by producing a body of empirical 
knowledge. Difficulty in developing and accessing accurate data has complicated 
efforts to study the extent and severity of the foreclosure crisis in the owner-
occupied/single family market (Newman, 2010), which suggests a key role for 
data and knowledge production in critical urban practice (Wyly, 2009). In this 
section of the article I consider how community organizations engaged in 
strategic positivism through constructing data and indicators to document 
predatory equity, evaluate investment risk and link investment practices to 
housing distress. Here I am interested to bring out the ways in which community-
based organizations and activists produced and engaged with quantitative data, 
and how this body of knowledge afforded socio-political action.3 
Developed by the University Neighborhood Housing Program (UNHP) in 
response to indicators that the multifamily market was heating up (rising sales 
prices, flat operating income) in the early 2000s, the Building Indicator Project 
(BIP) provides a holistic indicator of potential physical and/or financial distress 
for all multifamily rental buildings in New York City. It brings together several 
                                                        
3 Strategic positivism entails a complex set of methodological, political and epistemological 
commitments that also sit in conversation with other traditions of critical knowledge production 
and socio-political action, such as that of militant research. In this paper I employ strategic 
positivism as one analytic for getting at the ways in which all interpretations of the world involve 
action. In this view the production of knowledge through science doesn’t yield knowledge that is 
separate from socio-political practice; instead research (radically) reorganizes social and political 
relations. The analysis in this paper does not preclude other readings of the activities described. 
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public data sources on housing and building code violations and city-issued liens 
(water/sewage, back taxes, emergency repairs), and then indexes these data to 
create a single weighted score. A score of 800 or more “warrants examination to 
confirm probable physical and/or financial distress” (University Neighborhood 
Housing Program, 2011). With this monitoring tool UNHP and a variety of 
community organizations have put pressure on banks with irresponsible lending 
and asset management practices, shaped tenant organizing efforts, and influenced 
city policy.  
The data was especially effective in shaping a broad, multi-pronged 
campaign against New York Community Bank (NYCB), which financed 85,000 
units of multifamily housing that were in distress, twice that of any other entity 
(University Neighborhood Housing Program, 2011). By connecting NYCB to its 
role in funding the 2007 purchase of 51 Southwest Bronx buildings for $300M by 
the private equity-backed partnership SG2 and BlackRock Realty Advisors, BIP 
data aided Community Action for Safe Apartments in their tenant organizing 
campaign to protest the bank’s involvement in predatory equity. In the Urban 
Homesteading Assistance Board’s (UHAB) decision to narrow their predatory 
equity campaign to one bank rather than diluting their efforts across multiple 
institutions, BIP data helped them select NYCB. Under the bank’s watch, 34 
multifamily buildings (nearly 800 rental units) were in foreclosure and had a total 
of over 5000 housing code violations, meaning that tenants were living with an 
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average of more than six violations per unit.4 On The SurReal Estate, UHAB’s 
blog chronicling ongoing struggles around predatory equity, a feature called 
“Picture This!” showcased tenant-submitted photos of distressed physical 
conditions in overleveraged properties financed by NYCB. 
As a result of these and other efforts, the bank’s Community Reinvestment 
Act rating was downgraded from “outstanding” to “satisfactory” in 2012, in part 
due to concerns about how well it could ensure that multifamily borrowers could 
fulfill mortgage obligations and properly maintain properties (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, 2011). In its evaluation of the bank’s performance, the 
FDIC reviewed and considered BIP data (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
2011). BIP has also influenced the city’s approach to distressed multifamily 
properties. After being shocked by the deteriorated physical conditions in 
buildings that were part of a portfolio in the Northwest Bronx, housing officials 
looked to BIP as the inspiration for the city’s new Proactive Preservation 
Initiative. The initiative will develop indicators based on BIP to identify 
distressed multifamily properties and target emergency repairs in order to prevent 
such severe distress in the future.  
Community groups have also used strategic research to inductively create 
a rich quantitative database of predatory equity activity. Member organizations of 
the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, UHAB, Tenants 
                                                        
4 Housing organizers view three violations per unit as inhumane. 
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and Neighbors and UNHP all tracked market activity, researched property owners 
and organized tenants. These efforts created individual organizational lists of 
overleveraged properties that LISC then compiled, resulting in a master list of 
about 1100 buildings. Cross-referencing the master with a variety of other data 
sources including BIP, property value assessments, geographic building 
information, foreclosure filings, and Department of Finance data on deeds and 
debt instruments yielded the final database, which participating organizations 
continued to update with new data. Covering over 50,000 housing units owned by 
investors engaging in irresponsible real estate practices, it is the best measure of a 
phenomenon that is difficult to measure.  
Using the database, the Citizens Housing and Planning Council applied 
some of the analytic techniques used in the study of single-family foreclosure to 
examine the impacts of multifamily foreclosure and overmortgaging on the 
surrounding community.5 CHPC’s analysis showed that buildings within 500 feet 
of overleveraged properties are more likely to be physically deteriorated and have 
more housing code violations; those within 250 feet are more likely to have 
serious housing code violations requiring emergency repair intervention by the 
city (Shultz, Perine, Bahchieva, & Dasgupta, 2012).  
                                                        
5 Such as the work by Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith in research in Chicago, which evaluated 
the impact of foreclosure filings on property values and crime in the surrounding area. See: The 
External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property 
Values Housing Policy Debate, 17(1), 57-79; The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures 
on Neighborhood Crime. Housing Studies, 21(6), 851-866. 
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The database of overleveraged properties has also supported policy 
advocacy by LISC. The intermediary organization contributed public comments 
to the Federal Housing Finance Agency on the proposed structure for evaluating 
(under post-crisis government conservation) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s duty 
to underserved communities. LISC held that the government-sponsored 
enterprises should also preserve affordability in rental housing that they have 
previously financed, which may be overleveraged or at risk of loss because 
“current financing was based on unsustainable assumptions about rent growth, 
property values and other economic conditions” (O'Donnell, 2009, p. 3). The 
overleveraged property database affords the production of spatial knowledge 
about the geography of predatory equity and its potential neighborhood impacts 
that is at once rooted in the day-to-day work of community organizations, and can 
speak to policymakers.  
The examples considered in this section demonstrate how community-
based actors drew on quantitative and geographically-grounded methodologies as 
a means of documenting relationships between investors, financial institutions, 
debt, and physical and financial distress. In turn, these facts have contributed to 
the struggle—on the ground, in policy circles, and in academe--against the 
destabilizing impacts of financialization. This speaks to Wyly’s assertion that 
positivist research methodologies are not inextricably linked to oppressive, elite 
and exclusive politics: alternative knowledge production projects like BIP and the 
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overleveraged properties database suggest the power for “rigorous, radical 
analysis to expose the injustices of predatory capitalism and accumulation by 
dispossession” (Wyly, 2011, p. 907) and interweave meaningfully with claims-
making and policy advocacy.  
Reworking financial sites, spaces and structures  
Finally I turn to how community organizations took up financial structures 
as spaces of practice, re-inscribed hidden links between property as a distressed 
asset and property as distressed housing and traced networks of activism through 
global capital flows. Some of these examples, particularly the first two, could also 
be cast as akin to the strategic research practices considered in the previous 
section. Rather than being mutually exclusive, the analytics of strategic positivism 
and reworking finance might be better seen as potentially complementary. 
However, in this section of the paper, I want to emphasize how the rise of 
financial capitalism leaves a particular trail of artifacts and also produces spaces 
(and flows between them) that activists and community groups might enter in 
unexpected ways.  
The first case builds on the discrepancies between expectations for double-
digit profits in a single-digit growth sector, and between projected and actual 
tenant turnover rates discussed earlier. ANHD uncovered these insights through 
mining underwriting documents for a sample of nine property portfolios covering 
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nearly 10,000 rental units6 purchased by private equity firms and subsequently 
securitized in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) (ANHD, 2009b). 
For securitized loans borrowers must report revenue, expenses and vacancies to 
the loan servicer, who tracks this data against underwriting assumptions in the 
prospectus filed with the SEC. Thus while public data sources don’t typically 
provide information on financing terms and underwriting assumptions, ANHD 
accessed loan servicer reports compiled in an industry data service to undertake 
this analysis. Based on these data, each unit faced a discrepancy of $605 per 
month; across all 9876 units this makes for a shortfall of $6 million a month and 
$71.7 million a year (insert table 2 about here). Data on tenant turnover 
assumptions is less readily available, but in three major portfolios, underwriting 
was based on assumptions that 20-30% of units would turn over within a year of 
purchase—actual turnover rates in rent-stabilized apartments range from 5-10% a 
year (Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, 2009b; Rent 
Guidelines Board, 2009).  
Here financial artifacts provided a means of juxtaposing financial logics 
(as outlined in CMBS prospectuses) with measures grounded in the realities of the 
city’s affordable rental sector. In this way, ANHD employed the structures of 
                                                        
6 ANHD’s analysis included a 10th portfolio: Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village, which is an 
outlier from other portfolios because of its large size (11,227 units) and largely middle-class 
residents. I excluded the portfolio from my analysis for this reason. 
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finance to produce evidence of the risk and potential fraud involved in predatory 
equity purchases.  
The second example deals with how community groups entered a space of 
finance in order to reconstitute the link between housing as a financial asset on 
one hand and the materiality and use value of housing as home on the other. In 
this case, in 2007 government-sponsored enterprise Fannie Mae purchased a $29 
million note from Deutsche Bank for a portfolio of 19 properties (261 units) 
originally purchased by New York-based firm Ocelot Capital in partnership with 
Israeli real estate developers Eldan Tech (along with six other buildings) in 2005. 
It was only later that Fannie Mae found the note did not meet their underwriting 
standards. Ocelot went bankrupt soon after Fannie Mae purchased the debt and 
abandoned the properties, which deteriorated severely over the next two years 
before the mortgage went into foreclosure early in 2009.  
As tenants and community groups sought to hold the government-
sponsored enterprise accountable for improving living conditions in the 
properties, Fannie Mae sought to dispose of the loans through “DebtX: The Debt 
Exchange”, an online auction site for large financial institutions and institutional 
investors to trade debt, which one advocate referred to as the “eBay of distressed 
debt” (interview with Dina Levy of UHAB, 2010). Fannie Mae argued this was 
the most transparent means of disposing of the debt and transferring the properties 
to new, more responsible owners. However advocates feared the dynamics of an 
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auction would perpetuate the properties’ physical decline by bidding up to a sale 
price that didn’t reflecting existing problems and needed repairs. In the case of the 
Ocelot portfolio, community practice made tangible the connections between 
financial mechanics on the one hand and the physicality of properties as homes 
inhabited by people on the other, resituating what was happening in abstract 
online debt exchanges in the properties themselves. Learning that as many as 70 
potential bidders had requested bid packets in the first day, the Urban 
Homesteading Assistance Board and Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy 
Coalition launched into action: tenant associations held press conferences in front 
of buildings, posted signs to investors saying “don’t buy here” and “speculators 
keep out” in their windows (insert figure 3 about here), and conducted guided 
tours of deteriorated building conditions for politicians and the press (Levy, 
2011). These efforts engaged Senator Charles Schumer and Congressman Jose 
Serrano, who publicly pressured Fannie Mae to help tenants and brought the city 
onboard with substantial funds to offset renovation costs for a discount sale to a 
preservation buyer.7  
Finally, some activists reworked spaces of finance through building 
solidarities in the tracks of global capital flows. Movement for Justice in el Barrio 
                                                        
7 The properties were eventually sold to affordable housing developer Omni New York at a 
significant discount. 
  
36 
(MFJ), a group whose constituents are predominantly Mexican immigrants,8 has 
been one of several neighborhood-based organizations addressing predatory 
equity in East Harlem. MFJ links itself to the Other Campaign, a Mexican 
Zapatista political program fighting against neoliberalism and for self-
determination. One of MFJ’s key tactics is to link housing problems experienced 
in East Harlem with land struggles around the world (Maeckelbergh, 2012). The 
group globalizes solidarity through annual encouentros (encounters) that bring 
together social justice actors at a variety of spatial scales, including New York 
City neighborhood organizations and international activist groups. Recent 
encuentros have included live feeds with the Shack Dweller’s movement in South 
Africa, visited a community in Mexico that successfully halted the state’s effort to 
evict them, and connected with New Orleans residents who organized against 
post-Katrina eviction.  
In 2007 local landlord Steve Kessner, branded as one of the city’s ten 
worst landlords of 2006 by the Village Voice (Borrero, 2006), sold a group of 47 
East Harlem properties containing 1100 apartments to UK investment firm 
Dawnay Day for $225M. In the British press, the firm boasted of the profits it 
would make once they displaced tenants, and began pressuring longtime tenants 
to move, charging for basic repairs, and asking the predominantly immigrant 
                                                        
8 Mexican immigrants have changed the face of the traditionally Puerto Rican barrio of East 
Harlem: Henry Serrano of Community Voices Heard, observed that “all the cuchifrito [Puerto 
Rican fried foods] places have become taquerias” since the influx of immigrants from Puebla, 
Mexico started in the 1980s.  
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Latino residents for their Social Security numbers. The experiences of MFJ 
constituents under Dawnay Day’s ownership motivated MFJ to formalize 
transcontinental alliances they had been building up before. The group elected to 
take up activism in the UK in order to generate support on the Dawnay Day’s own 
turf.9 Meeting with over 30 organizations in Europe allowed MFJ to present films 
about their experiences with predatory equity and receive pledges of solidarity. 
This tactic illustrates the group’s understanding that East Harlem’s housing 
problems and displacement are intimately bound up in flows of global capital, and 
the ways financial actors can mobilize these flows in service of real estate 
development. Again highlighting the linkages between the fate of financial 
markets and the built environment, tightened credit markets led to Dawnay Day’s 
closure amidst insolvency in 2008, and the East Harlem portfolio officially went 
into foreclosure in 2009; their disposition remains unresolved. Nevertheless the 
point remains that MFJ’s approach to activism builds transnational alliances and 
solidarities across what could be otherwise distinct nodes within globalized flows 
of capital, underscoring how social struggles around land and housing can also 
circulate globally. 
Conclusions 
This paper has addressed how community organizations whose work 
focuses on affordable housing contend with the financialization of housing. The 
                                                        
9 Maeckelbergh (2012) provides more in-depth analysis of MFJ’s mobilizing against displacement. 
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neoliberal political economy more broadly and new financial practices in the 
housing market specifically present challenges to the practice of such 
organizations. Therefore I have focused on the potential for organizations to 
cultivate effective and innovative practices to contest the financialization of 
affordable rental housing. The study dealt with a wave of high-risk private equity 
investment in New York City’s rent-stabilized market during the mid-2000s real 
estate bubble, and the tactics community organizations developed in response. 
The findings highlighted how organizations constructed a critical narrative of 
predatory equity, used strategic positivism to study its geography and impacts and 
reworked financial sites, spaces and structures. In conclusion I discuss the first 
two tactics as part of a strategy of alternative knowledge production. Then I 
discuss the third tactic (reworking financial sites, spaces and structures) as 
suggestive of how contesting finance might draw on the dynamics of fixity and 
liquidity to enter financial terrain in unexpected ways. 
Alternative knowledge production 
Financialization operates at the level of investments and securities but also 
entails cultural and discursive strategies by which financial norms of risk and 
investment are disseminated throughout society (Allon, 2010; Randy Martin, 
2002). Private equity firms often framed their real estate investment strategies in 
terms of affordable rental properties as assets to be liberated onto the open 
market. Developing a politically compelling narrative of predatory equity thus 
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became an important and powerful tactic to counter the dominant discourse of 
finance. The media, politicians, academics and other opinion leaders ultimately 
took up the critical framing and terminology of predatory equity that community 
organizations constructed. However it was a struggle to legitimate this narrative, 
because community organizations are still largely viewed as activists, a view that 
persists despite political and economic constraints on activism by such groups. 
This struggle yielded insights about the importance of influencing key opinion 
leaders who can effectively sanction and circulate alternative narratives, 
underlining how contemporary community practice calls for organizations to take 
up multiple roles (Elwood, 2006; Larner & Craig, 2005; Majic, 2011).  
The role of critical narratives in contesting financialization speaks to how 
rhetorical framing strategies can work to challenge the “discursive naturalization” 
of market logic, and chart alternatives (Hackworth, 2007, p. 200). Here the 
contemporary variety and accessibility of media helped transcend some of the 
limits community groups face on (re)framing issues in the dominant sphere. 
Predatory Equity: The Survival Guide was produced through Making Policy 
Public, an initiative to engage designers in social debates and allow advocates to 
better reach their constituents through design (Making Policy Public, 2013). 
Professional graphic production created a visual identity for the issue, allowing 
activists to playfully present critical debate about predatory equity to tenants, the 
press, policymakers and other opinion leaders. The textual and visual narrative 
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made claims on tenants to mobilize and engage in activism, and on elected 
officials and financial institutions to recognize and take action on the problem. I 
would argue it was most successful in advancing a politicized public discourse of 
injustice (cf. Elwood, 2006; D. Martin, 2003) that explicitly linked predatory 
equity to the dynamics of the real estate boom, weakened underwriting standards 
and the role of securitization in allowing banks to shed risk. Literally framing the 
issue of predatory as a matter of survival for tenants and affordable rental housing 
more broadly, this discourse provided “crucial vocabularies and framing devices” 
(Wolf-Powers 2009 163), adding nuances about finance as extractive and 
predatory to a public and political conversation emphasizing a liberatory and 
constructive financial world.  
Alternative knowledge production does not only operate through rhetorical 
tactics; data-driven tactics contribute facts to “the war of ideas”. As a practice of 
alternative knowledge production, strategic positivism can be understood as both 
destructive of neoliberal practice and imperatives (e.g. critical mapping, insurgent 
quantitative practices and radical statistics that hold neoliberalism accountable 
and document its injustices), and creative of emancipatory alternatives to 
neoliberalism (Wyly, 2011). This paper detailed three examples of the former 
approach. With the Building Indicator Project and the overleveraged property 
database, community organizations drew on public data and their own on-the-
ground work to develop quantitative and geographic knowledge about predatory 
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equity that has informed organizing campaigns and policy advocacy as well as 
further research (including my own). Although discussed under the rubric of 
reworking spaces of finance, mining underwriting documents of CMBS also 
served as a mode of strategic positivism. The juxtaposition of assumptions about 
rental income, operating expenses and tenant turnover with real-world metrics 
exposed how the financial logics underlying predatory equity deals necessitated 
harassment and displacement (ANHD, 2009b).  
Community organizations are also using critical and strategic research to 
develop alternative approaches to land and housing that interrupt such real estate 
practices. For example Picture the Homeless has enumerated vacant property and 
housing with expiring subsidies as a means of substantiating claims for a 
community land trust (Picture the Homeless, 2012), demonstrating how such 
inquiry provides a starting point “to make better urban worlds possible and real”  
(Wyly, 2011, p. 908). Thus rather than being antithetical to insurgency, the 
analytic of strategic positivism shows how the acquisition of professional and 
technical skills and competencies can serve to destabilize normalized relations of 
neoliberalism. By producing and marshaling evidence to make injustice visible 
and measurable, the practice strategic positivism both supports rhetorical framings 
of social justice issues, and can independently mobilize action to achieve justice 
(Wyly et al., 2010).  
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Entering financial terrain 
Financialization entails a real production of space and artifacts, offering 
both challenges and possibilities for community practice. Through transcending 
property’s spatial fixity, financialization produces a territory of housing finance 
that, like urban space, can be unevenly developed (Gotham, 2009, drawing on 
Lefebvre, 2003). For example, in the run up to the financial crisis mortgage-
backed securities built up this territory; in its wake that space can be selectively 
reconstructed through the commodification of distressed assets. The case of 
predatory equity illustrates how financial actors are able to make use of both 
fixity and liquidity to meet objectives for yield. That is, a strategy that may have 
begun with the idea of upgrading and deregulating properties to capitalize on 
rental demand can become the basis for a market in distressed debt when that 
strategy fails. This insight affirms Allen’s (2011) assertion that space and 
spatiality make a difference in the ways power can be brought to bear (p. 291).  
The financialization of housing thus calls for new spatial strategies to 
achieve justice. More specifically, to contest financialization, community 
organizations and activists must develop powers of reach for both the territory of 
finance and material urban space. In this paper, I found that community 
organizations made innovative use of the dynamics of fixity and liquidity to 
contest financialization. For example, some efforts sought to reassert housing’s 
fixity (and therefore its use value) by entering spaces and structures of finance 
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and bringing them into relation with the material conditions of property and 
experiences of tenants. Thus mining underwriting documents and juxtaposing 
financial logics with actual income, expenses and tenant turnover draws our 
attention back to the fact of property as bricks and mortar. In the case of the 
Ocelot portfolio, community groups leveraged these material conditions to draw 
tenants’ experiences of property decline into the territory of finance. Tenants and 
community organizations reasserted the physicality of property and its ontological 
status as home in response to Fannie Mae’s attempt to sell distressed mortgage 
debt in an online debt exchange.  
This relates to tactics that make use of financial liquidity to move social 
and political action into the territory of finance. Movement for Justice turned 
global capital flows into circuits of solidarity, reaching social movement actors in 
the UK in order to lift out their activism from East Harlem and re-embed it on 
Dawnay Day’s own turf.  Tracing liquidity in this way uses the spatial form of 
capital flows to develop and maintain new political alliances.  
Financialization poses new challenges, both technical and strategic, for 
community organizations engaged in affordable housing work. Motivated to 
understand the political possibilities for contemporary community practice, this 
paper has addressed a gap in emerging literature on the geographies of 
financialization. It contributes detailed empirical knowledge about efforts to 
contest the financialization of housing and home, and offers a positive reading of 
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the potential of these efforts. Further research might continue to address how 
strategies of alternative knowledge production can work to denaturalize and 
challenge financial hegemony. Of special importance to developing new political 
strategies is developing a better understanding of finance itself as a space, and 
how its sites and artifacts can be colonized and taken up by activists and 
community groups in order to contest financialization.  
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Table 1: Participating organizations  
Citywide organizations Neighborhood-based 
organizations 
Housing policy, housing 
finance, property 
management, think tanks, for-
profit affordable housing 
Association for Neighborhood 
and Housing Development 
Banana Kelly Community 
Improvement Association 
NYC Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development 
Urban Homesteading 
Assistance Board 
Northwest Bronx Community and 
Clergy Coalition 
Neighborhood Restore 
Tenants and Neighbors University Neighborhood Housing 
Program 
PWB Property Management 
Community Preservation 
Corporation 
Community Action for Safe 
Apartments/New Settlement  
Federal Home Loan Bank of 
New York 
The Parodneck Foundation Movement for Justice in el Barrio Workforce Housing Advisors 
Mutual Housing Association of 
New York 
Community Voices Heard Citizen’s Housing and Planning 
Council Hope Community Inc. 
Catholic Migration Office 
Table 2: Discrepancy between underwritten and last reported net rental income for 9 major 
predatory equity portfolios. Source: ANHD, 2009b. 
 
Number of portfolios (units) 9 (9876) 
Rent revenues as underwritten (per unit per 
month) 
$1404 ($12640/9 portfolios) 
Last reported rent revenues (per unit per month) $842 ($7576/9 portfolios) 
Discrepancy between revenue as underwritten 
and last reported revenues (per unit per month) 
$562  
Operating expenses as underwritten (per unit per 
month) 
$604 
($4834/8 portfolios) 
*Data not available for 1 portfolio 
Last reported operating expenses (per unit per 
month) 
$647 ($5178/8 portfolios) 
*Data not available for 1 portfolio 
Discrepancy between operating expenses as 
underwritten and last reported operating 
expenses (per unit per month) 
$43 
Total discrepancy between net rental income as 
underwritten vs. last reported (per unit per 
month) 
$605 
(Shortfall for all units: $6m/month; $71M/year) 
